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The ALI's Complex Litigation Project and
Federal-To-State Consolidation: A Due Process
Analysis of Granting to State Courts Nationwide
Personal Jurisdiction
In response to the ever increasing burdens placed on the
judicial system by multiforum litigation involving multiple
parties, the American Law Institute ("ALI") has drafted and
proposed the enactment of a national complex litigation statute
(hereinafter the "Proposal"). The Proposal addresses the problems created by multiparty, multiforum litigation-particularly
the costs and inefficiencies created by the relitigation of
common issues-through mechanisms which transfer all related litigation to a single forum.' The transfer of related litigation to a single federal forum (i.e., state-to-federal and federalto-federal consolidation) is a t the core of the Proposal;
nevertheless, the Proposal also includes a mechanism for the
transfer of related litigation to the proper court of a single
state (federal-to-state on solid at ion).^ To facilitate state court
consolidation, the Proposal confers broad powers on state
transferee courts. Most notable among these powers are the
authority to exert jurisdiction "to the full extent of the power
conferrable on a federal court under the United States
Constitution" and the power to exercise nationwide service of
p r o ~ e s s . ~This expansion of the territorial jurisdiction
exercisable by state courts probably violates the requirements
of due process, but remains a useful mechanism for reducing
judicial inefficiency.' This paper focuses on the due process
1. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT: STATUTORY
AND ANALYSIS, chs. 4, 5, and 6. (1994) [hereinafter COMPLEX
RECOMMENDATIONS
LITIGATION PROPOSAL].
2. The American Law Institute has also suggested the formulation of an
Interstate Complex Litigation Compact or a Uniform Complex Litigation Act which
would be "designed to facilitate the transfer and consolidation in one state court of
similar actions lodged in the courts of two or more states." COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 1, 5 4.02 ch. 4 Introductory Note (a) a t 166.
3. Id. 8 3.08 (a) a t 147 (emphasis added).
4. The ALI's provision for federal-to-state transfers of multiparty, multiforum
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concerns implicated by the Proposal's enlargement of state
court jurisdiction.
Part I1 of this paper outlines the general structure of the
federal-to-state transfer mechanism of the Proposal. This part
considers the Proposal's provisions for enlarging the territorial
jurisdiction of state courts and providing them with the power
to serve process nationwide. Part I11 addresses the
constitutionality of the Proposal's expansion of the territorial
jurisdiction of state courts. Finally, Part IV explores the utility
of providing a mechanism for federal-to-state consolidation
within the confines of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.

State courts currently manage and adjudicate an immense
(and continually increasing) number of multiparty, multiforum
cases.5 Section 4.01 was drafted to fill "a gapv6 in the
Proposal's scheme for single-forum consolidation: the lack of a
procedure "for moving cases from the federal to the state courts
in situations involving both state and federal lawsuits when a
state court may be the preferable forum for the adjudication of
The Proposal, however, states that this
a complex di~pute."~
consolidation to state courts should only be used "under certain
Initially this part of the paper
very limited ~ircumstances."~
will set forth the parameters of these "very limited
circ~mstances."~The specific provisions for enlarging the
territorial jurisdiction of state courts and providing them with
the power of nationwide service of process will then be
examined.

litigation poses numerous other constitutional questions such as: do federal-to-state
transfers violate the Tenth Amendment or Article I11 of the Constitution?; do such
transfers inappropriately curtail the jurisdiction of the federal courts?; and do such
transfers violate the equal protection principles of the Fifth Amendment by treating
multiforum cases with multiple parties different from other cases? For a general
exploration of these issues, see Joan Steinman, Reverse Removal, 78 IOWA L. REV.
1029 (1993).
5. Asbestos litigation is one of the better-known illustrations of this
development. Of the 17,120 asbestos exposure cases pending against JohnsMansville a t the time of its filing for bankruptcy, approximately two-thirds of the
cases (11,143) had been brought in state rather than federal court. Parish, Asbestos
Litigation-Dimensions of the Problem, STATECT. J., Winter 1984, a t 5.
6. COMPLEXL ~ G A T I OPROPOSAL,
N
supra note 1, a t 166.
7. Id. a t 165.
8. Id. at 166.
9. Id. a t 220.
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A. Designation of a State Court as a Transferee Forum
Section 4.01(a) delineates the Proposal's requisites for
federal-to-state transfers:
Subject to the exceptions in subsection (c), when determining under 8 3.04 where to transfer and consolidate actions, the Complex Litigation Panel" may designate a state
court as the transferee court if the Panel determines
(1) that the events giving rise to the controversy are
centered in a single state and a significant portion of the
existing litigation is lodged in the courts of that state;
(2) that fairness to the parties and the interests of justice
will be materially advanced by transfer and consolidation of
the federal actians with other suits pending in the state court;
and
(3) that the state court is more appropriate than other
possible transferee courts."

These federal-to-state transfer conditions are most likely to
be present in the narrow range of multiparty, multiforum litigation which arises from area pollution, insurance coverage,
and "single disaster" events such as the 1981 catastrophic collapse of the Hyatt Skywalk in Kansas City." According to the
Proposal, these types of litigation lend themselves particularly
well to adjudication in state courts.13
Subsection (a) further requires the "consent of the appropriate judicial authority in the state in which the designated
transferee court is located."" This requirement is an attempt
to address federalism concerns raised by the transfer of litigation from a federal forum to a state court. Such a transfer could
be perceived as forcing yet another federal matter upon the
meager resources of the state judicial system^.'^
In subsection (b) of section 4.01, the Proposal lists the
factors that the Complex Litigation Panel should consider in
determining whether the requirements of subsection (a) (other
10. The AL17s Proposal contemplates the establishment of a Complex Litigation Panel of federal judges that would be given the responsibility of deciding
whether separate civil actions that involve common questions of fact should be
consolidated for pretrial proceedings, trial, or both. The Panel would also eventually choose the forum for the proceedings. See id. at 437-53.
11. Id. at 177 (footnote added).
12. Id. at 168.
13. Id.
14. Id. 4 4.01(a) at 178.
15. Id. note (d) to Chapter 4, at 174.
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than the consent requirement) have been met. The factors
listed in subsection (b) are:
(1)the number of the individual cases that initially were
filed or are pending in state courts relative to the number of
actions pending in federal courts;
(2) the number of states in which the state and federal
cases are located;
(3) whether the procedures or law to be applied in the
state transferee court differ from that which would have been
applied by a federal transferee court to a sufficient degree
that designation of the state transferee court creates a risk of
prejudice to some of the parties to be transferred there; and
(4) any other factor indicating the need to accommodate a
particular state or federal interest.16

Factors (1)and (2) address whether related cases are concentrated in the state court system of a particular state (judicial
and geographic concentration) while factors (3) and (4) look at
issues of fairness.
Even if the conditions of section 4.01(a) are met, some
kinds of federal cases are not subject to the Complex Litigation
Panel's authority to transfer cases. Subsection (c) of section 4.01 exempts from transfer to a state court: (one) any
action that is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts; (two) any action that has been removed to a federal
court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 5 1441(d), 28 U.S.C.
5 1442, or 28 U.S.C. 5 1443; (three) any action brought in federal court under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 5 1983; and (four)
any action brought by the United States under 28 U.S.C.
5 1345 or removed by it under 28 U.S.C. 5 1444.17 These actions were excluded from transfer to state court because they
embrace "areas in which Congress has expressed an interest in
assuring that a federal forum be available."18 Hence, the
government's and the parties' substantial interests in securing
a federal forum are allowed to predominate.

B. Personal Jurisdiction in the State Transferee Court
In addition to delineating the necessary conditions for
federal-to-state transfer, section 4.01(a) also, through the incor-

16. Id. § 4.01(b) at 178.
17. Id. 5 4.01(c) at 178.
18. Id. 8 4.01 cmt. g at 195.
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poration of other sections of the Proposal, confers various powers on state transferee courts. Specifically, section 4.01(a) provides that "[olnce transfer is approved, a state transferee court
shall have the same powers and responsibilities as a federal
transferee court under sections 3.06(c), 3.08, 5.03 and 5.04."19
Addressing the personal jurisdictional power of the transferee court, section 3.08 states:
(a) Once actions have been transferred and consolidated
by the Complex Litigation Panel, the transferee court may
exercise jurisdiction over any parties to those actions or any
parties2' later joined to the consolidated proceeding to the
h l l extent of the power conferrable on a federal court under
the United States Constitution.
(b) Once actions have been transferred and consolidated
by the Complex Litigation Panel, a subpoena for attendance
at a hearing or trial, if authorized by the transferee court
upon motion for good cause shown and upon such terms and
conditions as the court may impose, may be served at any
place within the jurisdiction of the United States or anywhere
outside the United States if not otherwise prohibited by
law.21

19. Id. $ 4.01(a) a t 178. Discussion of the powers conferred by $5 3.06, 5.03,
and 5.04 is outside the scope of this paper. As a general matter, $ 3.06(c) discusses the discretion that the transferee court has when it severs issues, id. $ 3.06 (c)
at 114-15. Section 5.03 addresses supplemental jurisdiction, id. $ 5.03 a t 256-57,
and $ 5.04 confers upon transferee courts the power to enjoin transactionally related proceedings pending in other state or federal courts, id. $ 5.04 a t 263.
20. Due process analysis of the exercise of personal jurisdiction has, for the
most part, focused on jurisdiction over defendants. But see Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Shutts, 472 U.S.797 (1985) for an analysis of the personal jurisdictional requirements imposed when potential members of the plaintiff class in a class action are
absent. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff is rarely an issue because plaintiffs are considered to have impliedly consented to jurisdiction by selecting the particular forum. See Adams v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938). As is recognized by the
Proposal, however, "In many complex litigation situations under this proposal, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant will have selected the transferee forum." COMPLEX LITIGATIONPROPOSAL,
supra note 1, $ 3.08 cmt. a a t 148. The Proposal therefore concludes that "whether the transferee court has the power to enter a binding
judgment should be determined by a standard applicable to all the parties; there
should be no less rigorous a standard for asserting jurisdiction over plaintiffs than
over defendants in this context." Id. Consequently, the due process limitations on
the Proposal's provisions for personal jurisdiction in state courts to which multiforum, multiparty litigation is transferred apply with equal force to both plaintiffs
and defendants. Thus, for the analytical purposes of this paper all defendant-centered language used in the due process cases should be considered to apply with
equal force to plaintiffs.
21. COMPLEXLITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, $ 3.08 a t 147 (footnote
added).
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The comments following section 4.01 explain the Proposal's
reasoning in conferring such expansive jurisdictional power on
the state transferee court: "[Ilf the court were limited by its
own long-arm statute, it might not be able to embrace all of the
elements of the dispersed litigation . . . [and thus] might not be
able to provide the just and efficient resolution of all the consolidated actions."22 The Proposal thus confers powers upon
state courts which the state legislature itself may have seen fit
to withhold fiom the state's courts.

111. DUEPROCESS
ANALYSIS
OF THE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION
OF STATETRANSFEREE
COURTS
In analyzing the due process issues raised by the
Proposal's expansion of a state transferee court's territorial
jurisdiction, this section of the paper will first set forth the due
process arguments presented in the Proposal to justify such
expansion. These arguments will then be evaluated.

A. The Proposal's Due Process Analysis
The distinction between the due process limits that restrain the assertion of federal judicial power and the limits on
the states' exercise of judicial power is the basis for the
Proposal's assertion that the expansion of a state transferee
court's territorial jurisdiction does not violate the United States
Constitution. In the comments to section 4.01, the Proposal
states:
Nationwide service of process for complex litigation would be
under the authorization of a federal statute and not simply an
assertion of state power. Congress has the power to enact
such a statute as part of its authority over interstate commerce. Thus, jurisdiction under this federal statute would not
be limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but would be controlled by the Fifth Amendment
and the power of Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment under Section 5 of that Amendment.23

In other words, the Proposal asserts that because the source of
legislation is federal, the FiRh Amendment due process analysis is more appropriately applied to a state transferee court's

22. Id. 8 4.01 cmt. f at 193.
23. Id. 4 4.01 cmt. f at 193-94.
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exercise of nationwide personal jurisdiction. Application of the
Fifth Amendment is important because the Supreme Court
cases which have struck down extraterritorial assertions of
personal jurisdiction have been based on the limits placed on
state power by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment .24
Although the Proposal asserts that a Fifth Amendment due
process analysis is the appropriate test for determining the
constitutionality of a state transferee court's exercise of nationwide personal jurisdiction, the Proposal does not specifically
analyze the restraints that the Fifth Amendment places on the
assertion of personal jurisdiction by state transferee courts.
Rather, the Proposal apparently presumes that because jurisdiction would be provided by a federal statute, the Fifth
Amendment would place duplicate restrictions on the exercise
of personal jurisdiction by both federal and state transferee
courts. Accordingly, the Proposal's due process analysis of the
personal jurisdictional power of state transferee courts under
section 4.01, for the most part, merely incorporates the
Proposal's due process analysis of the personal jurisdictional
power of federal transferee courts under section 3.08.'~ It is
therefore necessary to examine the due process analysis provided in the comments to section 3.08.
Comment (e) to section 3.08 appraises the limitations on
the personal jurisdictional power of the transferee court under
the Fifth Amendment by drawing analogies from the Supreme
Court's decisions concerning the Fourteenth Amendment. Such
comparisons are necessary because the Supreme Court has
never decided a personal jurisdiction case under the Fifth
Amendment. It is therefore uncertain how due process limitations under the Fifth Amendment are to be determined.26As

24. Id. a t 194. The comments to § 4.01 also rely on 9 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Amendment's enforcement provision, to justify expansion of state
jurisdiction. This is neatly done since the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment places demands on state governments which restrict state sovereignty.
Under the aegis of 5 5 of that amendment, however, the Proposal wishes to expand state sovereignty to an unprecedented degree. Section 5 states, "Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.amend. XIV, 5 5. Whether the Proposal is enforcing "the provisions of this article [Amendment XIVI" or implementing some other goal is beyond
the scope of this paper, but the Proposal's reliance on !j 5, a t least initially, seems
misplaced.
PROPOSAL,
supra note 1, $ 4.01 cmt. f a t (238-39).
25. COMPLEXLITIGATION
26. Id. 9 3.08 cmt. e at 156.
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the Proposal indicates, however, "[t]he analogies are wellfounded . . . because the relevant language of both amendments
is identi~al."~'
Under well-known Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence,
a state may assert personal jurisdiction over a defeedant who
has "minimum contacts" with the forum state when the assertion of jurisdiction will not violate traditional notions of "fair
play and substantial justi~e.'"~Drawing from the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process analysis, the Proposal concludes that
"just as an analysis of state contacts and fairness are [sic] pertinent to the decision of whether a particular assertion of jurisdiction violates the Fourteenth Amendment, reference to national contacts and fairness appears to be proper for determining whether FiRh Amendment constraints are ~atisfied."~'
The Proposal thus advances a two-prong test for determining
whether the transferee court's exercise of personal jurisdiction
conforms with the due process requirements of the Fifth
Amendment: (1) national contacts and (2) fairness. These
prongs will be discussed in turn.
1. National contacts
The national contacts prong of the Proposal's Fifth Arnendment analysis is derived from International Shoe Co. v.
Washington's pronouncement that for a state to exercise juris-

27. Id. The pertinent language of both amendments states that no person
shall be deprived "of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST.amend. V, amend. XIV, $1.
I t should be noted that the Supreme Court has relied on Fourteenth Amendment cases to analyze due process constraints on the federal government in areas
other than personal jurisdiction. For instance, in Mathews v. Eldridge the Supreme
Court stated: "Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or 'property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the FiRh or Fourteenth Amendment." 424 U.S.
319, 332 (1976).
Such precedents provide some support for the Proposal's analogy, but the United States Supreme Court has applied different standards to state and federal governments in the past. In voting rights cases, for example, the Court has held that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution imposes a "one-man, onevote principle." See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1963). This principle has been
applied with virulence to state and local governments. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). This principle of absolute equality in vote strength flies in
the face of the United States Constitution which allows each state to send two
Senators to the federal legislative branch regardless of population.
28. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken V. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
29. COMPLEX
LITIGATIONPROPOSAL, supra note 1, $ 3.08 cmt. e a t 156.
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diction over a person, certain "minimum contacts" must exist
between that state and the person over whom jurisdiction is
asserted. Extending this concept of "minimum contacts" to its
Fifth Amendment analysis, the Proposal asserts that due process, in the federal context, requires minimum contacts between the United States and the person over whom jurisdiction
is a~serted.~'
The Proposal's national contacts test is not new. When
lower federal courts have tested the constitutionality of federal
statutes conferring nationwide jurisdiction, national contacts
have been central to their inquiry. These courts have sustained
jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant's presence in, or the
defendant's mere contact with, the United state^.^' Although
the full Court has not addressed the issue, two Supreme Court
Justices have supported federal court jurisdiction on the basis
of the defendant's presence in, or contacts with, the United
States.32In Stafford v. Briggs, the national contacts approach
was applied by the lower courts to uphold jurisdiction authorized by the Mandamus and Venue
The Supreme Court
reversed on other grounds, but dissenting Justice Stewart,
joined by Justice Brennan, addressed the national contacts
question. Justice Stewart wrote that "due process requires only
certain minimum contacts between the defendant and the sovereign that has created the court."34
In short, based on analogies to International Shoe's Fourteenth Amendment analysis, decisions of the lower federal
courts, and dicta from two retired Supreme Court Justices, the
Proposal asserts that national contacts is the proper basis for
asserting personal jurisdiction under the Fifth A m e n d ~ n e n t . ~ ~
30. Id. a t 157.
31. See, e.g., Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956 (1st Cir.
1984); Hogue v. Milodon Eng'g, Inc., 736 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1984); FTC v. Jim
Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1981).
32. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S.527, 530-33 (1980).
33. Id.
34. Id. a t 554 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justices Stewart and Brennan are,
however, no longer with the Court.
35. It should be noted, however, that the national contacts approach has only
been addressed within the context of federal question cases. Nevertheless, the Proposal concludes that "there is no basis for concluding that the Fifth Amendment
supports a national-contacts test for nondiversity cases, but that a more limited
PROPOSAL, supra note
test must be used in diversity cases." COMPLEX LITIGATION
1, at 157 (citing Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 70 (1984)). Furthermore, the
Proposal argues:
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2. Fairness
Among the lower federal courts that have employed a national contacts test, there is disagreement about the precise
standard that should be applied. This disagreement centers on
whether jurisdiction can be based purely on national contacts
or whether a fairness requirement must also be ~ a t i s f i e d . ~ ~
Nevertheless, even courts adopting the "pure" national contacts
approach have acknowledged that all litigants enjoy the right
to a fair forum.37 These courts, however, maintain that the
right to a fair forum is addressed adequately by statutory provisions regarding venue and transfer.38
As mentioned, the Proposal has adopted a standard that
includes both the fairness requirement and the showing of national contact^.^' The reporter's notes to section 3.08 comment
(e) state that "[gliven the eradication of precise venue limitations on transfer under this proposal, reliance on national contacts without a separate fairness inquiry would be questionable."40 In the case of state transferee courts the issue of removing venue and transfer protections is irrelevant because
federal statutory venue and transfer provisions are not applicable to state courts.

Complex diversity litigation has all of the characteristics that currently
justify the national-contacts standard: (1) the need to provide a forum for
litigation to correct and control severe problems in the national economy
that are likely to involve parties across the country acting in a similar
fashion or being injured by similar conduct; (2) the need to provide a
forum where all parties can be subjected to jurisdiction, when no single
state has that power; and (3) the need to provide a convenient forum for
litigation to marshall and conserve the assets of a n insolvent party.
Id. Nevertheless, the appropriateness of a national contacts test for nondiversity
cases remains uncertain.
36. Id. 5 3.08 reporter's note to cmt. e (lo), a t 157-58. For cases which have
employed a "puren national contacts approach in their Fifth Amendment analysis,
see Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1984); Hogue v.
Milodon Eng'g, Inc., 736 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1984); FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651
F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1981). Cases which have articulated a fairness requirement in
addition to a showing of national contacts include Handley v. Indiana & Mich.
Elec. Co., 732 F.2d 1265 (6th Cir. 1984) and Home v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d
255 (3d Cir. 1982).
37. See, e.g., Trans-Asiatic Oil, 743 F.2d 956; Hogue, 736 F.2d 989; Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251.
38. Id.
39. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, 5 3.08 cmt. e a t 157. See
also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
40. Id. reporter's notes to cmt. e (10) a t 158 (citation omitted).
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The factors contemplated by the Proposal in determining
whether a transferee court's assertion of personal jurisdiction
over a litigant is fair can be derived from comment (f) to section 3.08, "Application of the proposed standard."" According
to comment (f), the Complex Litigation Panel should balance
two factors in determining whether exercise of personal jurisdiction by the transferee court is fair: (1) the actual hardship or
inconvenience imposed on a particular party and (2) the "systemic interests and need to provide a conclusive adjudication
for all of the litigants."42 Comment (f) does not indicate the
relative weight the Complex Litigation Panel should give each
factor, although it does acknowledge that it may be egregiously
unfair to force "a truly local party" to litigate in a distant court,
thereby leaving the litigant without remedy if he or she refuses
(or is unable) to travel cross-country to vindicate legitimate
rights.43The Proposal, however, does grant the Complex Litigation Panel the authority to exempt litigants from having
their cases sent to the transferee forum whenever "fairness
concerns so r e q ~ i r e . " ~

B. Analysis of the Proposal's Fifih Amendment National
Contacts and Fairness Test as Applied to
State Transferee Courts
Having examined the Proposal's Fifth Amendment analysis
and its rationale for applying such analysis to the exercise of
nationwide personal jurisdiction by a state transferee court,
this paper will next examine the appropriateness of applying
the Proposal's Fifth Amendment analysis to state transferee
courts.

1. National contacts

As previously noted, the Proposal asserts that the Fifth
Amendment's national contacts analysis is properly applied to
state transferee courts because they will be exercising nationwide personal jurisdiction under the authority of federal legisl a t i ~ n Some
. ~ ~ support for this assertion can perhaps be found

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. cmt. f at 158.
Id. at 159.
Id.
Id. at 160.
See supra part 1II.A.
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in World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. W o ~ d s o n .In
~~
Volkswagen the Supreme Court stated that the concept of minimum contacts
perform[s] two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a
distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the
States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond limits
imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a
federal system."

If restrictions on state power are a t the core of the minimum contacts requirement of the Due Process Clause, then the
source of legislation under which a state is acting would seem
critical. As the Proposal recognizes, "the Volkswagen Court's
concern about possible friction between coequal sovereigns is
inapplicable when the state tribunal is acting under authority
granted by C~ngress."~Without the concern about possible
friction between coequal sovereigns, it is arguable that the
minimum contacts analysis need not be restricted to state
boundaries. Thus, when states are acting under authority
granted by Congress, a national contacts approach to a due
process analysis may be appropriate.
Nevertheless, the significance of the Due Process Clause in
restricting state power was questioned in Insurance Corp. of
Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee:
The restriction on state sovereign power described in WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. . . . must be seen as ultimately a
h c t i o n of the individual liberty interest preserved by the
Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the
personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes
no mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an independent restriction on the
sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to waive
the personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions
cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise be protected."

46.
47.
48.
49.

444 U.S.286 (1986).
Id. at 291-92.
COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 1, 94.01. cmt. f at 194.
456 U.S.694, 703 n.10 (1982).
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If restrictions on state power are, as Bauxites implies, only
tangential to the minimum contacts requirement of the Due
Process Clause, then the source of legislation under which a
state is acting would seem to be of limited importance. Thus,
even when states are acting under authority granted by Congress, state boundaries may still be significant in a minimum
contacts analysis.
Additional questions concerning the appropriateness of
applying a national contacts analysis to the state court's exercise of nationwide personal jurisdiction are raised in cases and
literature addressing the application of a national contacts
approach to questions of federal court jurisdiction. According to
some lower courts and commentators, the Due Process Clause
permits courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over any defendant who is located within or has minimum contacts with the
government responsible for creating the court.50The Proposal
itself quotes Supreme Court language which indicates that due
process requires contacts with the government responsible for
creating the court: "[Dlue process requires only certain minimum contacts between the [defendant] and the sovereign that
has created the court."51
If contacts with the government responsible for creating
the court is the proper due process analysis, then, while minimum contacts with the United States may be sufficient to support a federal court's exercise of nationwide personal jurisdiction, it is not sufficient to support a state court's exercise of
such power. Thus, the Proposal's application of a national contacts analysis to the state transferee court's exercise of personal jurisdiction may be improper. Although the state courts
would be acting under the auspices of the federal government,
such courts are still the creation of state governments and not
of the federal government.

50. See, e.g., Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816 (6th Cir. 1981)
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir.
1979); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 US. 527 (1980); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138
(2d Cir. 1974). See also Thomas F. Green, Jr., Federal Jurisdiction in Personam of
Corporations and Due Process, 14 VAND.L. REV. 967 (1960-61); Note, Alien Corporation and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal Jurisdictional Standard, 95
HARV. L. REV. 470.
51. Stafford, 444 US. at 554 (Stewart, J., dissenting), quoted in COMPLEX
LITIGATIONPROPOSAL, 4 3.08, reporter's notes to cmt. e (lo), at 158.
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It could be argued that because state transferee courts
would assert nationwide jurisdiction under the authorization of
a federal statute, the state transferee courts would assume the
nature of federally created fora making nationwide contacts the
appropriate personal jurisdiction analysis. Nevertheless, the
Proposal does not envision the state transferee court being coopted into the federal judiciary system.
Comment (f) to section 4.01 states that the "state judge
handling consolidation proceedings under section 4.01 continues to sit as a state j~dge."'~State transferee judges must
continue to sit as state judges because "Congress could not effectively confer Article I11 authority in this context because
most state judges do not have life-time tenure and the other
attributes of the federal judi~iary."'~Furthermore, "[allthough
Congress might designate state transferee courts as Article I
courts, that might be deemed to conflict with various state
constitutional provisions prohibiting judges from serving in
incompatible offices, thereby effectively preventing judges from
those states from serving as transferee courts."54Thus, even if
the Proposal did seek to conscript state judges for federal service, state court judges would be prevented from serving the
federal system by the federal constitution and in many cases by
individual state constitutions.
Since state courts are the creation of state governments,
regardless of the source of legislation under which the state
court operates, the pertinent forum for a due process analysis
of a state court's exercise of personal jurisdiction may well be
the state in which the court is located. Under a state contacts
analysis, litigants would need minimum contacts with the state
in which the state transferee court sits in order to meet the due
process requirements of either the Fourteenth or the Fifth
Amendment.
Thus far, only one commentator has addressed the appropriateness of the Proposal's nationwide contacts analysis for
determining the constitutionality of a state transferee court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction. Joan Steinman argues against
a national contacts analysis:

52. COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 1, 5 4.01 cmt. f at 192.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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"[Tlhe question is whether the polity, whose power the court
wields, possesses a legitimate claim to exercise force over the
defendant" (quoting Marryellen Fullerton, Constitutional
Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal
Courts 79 Nw. U.L. REV.1, 15 (1984)).However, state governments, not the federal government, create state courts. Thus,
it is the state that must possess a legitimate basis for exercising personal jurisdiction. The power of the United States to
subject those within its borders or those who have minimum
contacts with the nation to jurisdiction in any of its courts is
irrelevant. While, "[als far as exercise of the federal judicial
power is concerned, state boundaries are given no significance
by the Constitution," when it comes to federal legislative power concerning state judicial power, state boundaries have
constitutional significance. Regardless of who is doing the
legislating, the relevant boundaries are those of the sovereign
that has created the court (quoting Lisak v. Mercantil
Bankcorp, 34 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987), cert denied sub
nom. Lisak v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988)).
The state is the entity with which defendants must have
contact.55

Steinman's view is by no means conclusive. Nevertheless,
it suggests that the national contacts prong of the Proposal's
Fifth Amendment analysis is of questionable application within
the context of a state transferee court's exercise of nationwide
personal jurisdiction.
2. Fairness

In applying the Proposal's Fifth Amendment fairness standard, section 3.08's comment (f) employs factors resembling
those currently used to evaluate "fair play" in the Fourteenth
Amendment cases.56 First, comment (f) stresses the need to
measure the actual hardship or inconvenience imposed on a
particular litigant.57This examination of the hardship on or
inconvenience to a litigant reflects the Fourteenth Amendment
analysis of the burden on the defendant.58
Second, comment (f) also appears to require that the hardship or inconvenience on the litigants be balanced against the

55.
56.
57.
58.

Steinman, supra note 4, at 1119.
COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 1, at 158.
Id. at 159-60.
See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.

Woodson., 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
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"systemic interests and need to provide a conclusive adjudication for all the litigant^."^' Similarly, Fourteenth Amendment
due process analysis as explicated by the Supreme Court balances the burden placed on the defendant against the interests
of the other parties to the litigation and of the judicial system
itself. More explicitly, the Court's due process analysis weighs
the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief, the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of disputes, and the states' shared interest in
furthering substantive social policies.60
Comparing the factors applied in the Proposal's fairness
inquiry and those factors currently used to evaluate whether
the assertion of jurisdiction conforms to "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice" in Fourteenth Amendment
cases,61 it is questionable whether any substantial difference
exists between the two tests. The only factor the Proposal implies which may be significantly divergent between Fourteenth
Amendment cases and those falling within the purview of the
Proposal is the role played by state boundaries in determining
the hardship or burden placed on the litigant.62
Comment (f) to section 3.08 asserts that "state boundaries
cannot be used as a proxy for fairness in the Fifth Amendment
context; crossing state boundaries does not accurately measure
the practical degree of hardship or inconvenience to litigants
because their circumstances may be so different."63This comment seems to imply that state boundaries are only important
in evaluating the burden on the defendant in Fourteenth
Amendment cases.
Nevertheless, if minimum contacts with the state in which
the transferee court is located are required to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction by state transferee courts, the
Proposal's argument that state boundaries are not determinative in assessing fairness under the Fifth Amendment may be
moot. At least within the context of section 4.01,then, the
Proposal's fairness prong would be practically indistinguishable

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 1, $3.08 cmt. f at 159.
World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
COMPLEX LITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 1, at 160.
COMPLEX LITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 1, $3.08 cmt. f at 160.
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from the criteria currently used to evaluate "fair play" in Fourteenth Amendment cases.

As previously noted, the Proposal's argument that national
contacts can sustain nationwide personal jurisdiction under a
Fifth Amendment due process analysis may not apply in the
context of state transferee courts because state courts are the
creation of state government^.^^ If national contacts cannot
sustain state transferee jurisdiction, litigants who do not fkeely
consent to the jurisdiction of an alien court must have the
requisite minimum contacts with the state in which the transferee court sits to be subject to that forum. In short, state
transferee court jurisdiction would be subject to the same Fourteenth Amendment minimum as state court jurisdiction generally. In addition, state transferee court jurisdiction would
have to satisfy the Fifth Amendment fairness analysis, which,
as we have seen,65is essentially equivalent to the Fourteenth
Amendment fair play analysis that non-transferee state court
jurisdiction also must satisfy. Thus, if nationwide contacts are
not an appropriate indicator of state transferee jurisdiction,
state transferee courts, in exercising personal jurisdiction, will
be subject to the same due process requirements that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on all state courts.
Given the facts that Fourteenth Amendment due process
limitations may apply to state transferee courts' exercise of
personal jurisdiction, it becomes necessary to examine whether
any state consolidation provisions (such as that exemplified by
section 4.01)can actually be a viable part of this (or any other)
complex litigation statute. The Proposal asserts that "state
transferee courts can be true partners in handling complex litigation only if they are able to exert the same nationwide jurisdiction as do their federal counterpart^."^^ Nevertheless, this
part of the paper will argue that a federal-to-state consolidation
provision such as section 4.01 of the Proposal remains a useful
tool for the efficient adjudication of multiforum, multiparty liti-

64. See supra part 1II.B.
65. See supra part III.B.2.
66. Id. $4.01, cmt. f at 193.
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gation even if state transferee courts lack nationwide personal
jurisdiction.

A. A Significant Number of Related Federal Cases Will Be
Eligible for Transfer to State Court
One of the purposes of section 4.01 federal-to-state consolidation is to promote judicial efficiency by reducing, and if possible, eliminating the duplication of effort that is inevitable in
the independent prosecution of parallel state and federal
claims.67Not all related federal cases must be consolidated in
order to reduce such duplicative effort. Thus, "[elven if it is
determined that a particular litigant should not be required to
participate in the consolidated proceeding, that conclusion does
not inevitably require that the consolidated resolution of the
dispute be a b a n d ~ n e d . "Nevertheless,
~~
the usefulness of section 4.01 is, at least to some degree, dependent on the ability to
transfer a sufficient portion of the cases lodged in federal
courts to the state transferee court to achieve a meaningfbl
reduction in judicial redundancy.
In calculating the proportion of federal cases that will
generally be amenable to consolidation in a state transferee
court, it is important to consider the two types of federal cases
that will exist: (1) cases in which the transferee state court
could exercise jurisdiction over all the litigant^,^^ but for the
fact that one of the parties opted for a federal forum; and (2)
cases in which the transferee state court could not exercise
jurisdiction over all the litigants. The first category of federal
cases are capable of being consolidated in the state transferee
forum, while the second category of federal cases is not constitutionally transferrable to the state court if the state transferee
court cannot assert nationwide personal jurisdiction. Thus, in
determining the proportion of federal cases that will generally
be susceptible to consolidation in a state transferee court, it is
necessary to know the ratio of cases falling within the first
category to cases falling within the second category.
67. See COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 1, Ch. 3, Introductory
Note at 36-37.
68. Id. 93.08 cmt. f at 159.
69. In addition to being limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the territorial jurisdiction of a state court can be limited by its own
long-arm statute. See id. at 150. For the purpose of analysis, however, this paper
will only look at limits imposed by the Constitution, not those imposed on a court
by the state itself.

10191

NATIONWIDE PERSONAL JURISDICTION

1037

Under section 4.01 of the Proposal, a federal-to-state transfer will only be appropriate when "the events giving rise to the
controversy are centered in a single state and a significant
portion of the existing litigation is lodged in the courts of that
state."?' When events and parties are concentrated in a single
state, it would seem that cases fitting in the first category of
federal cases would be prevalent, because minimum contacts
would likely exist between the litigants and the state forum.
For example, in the cases arising from the 1981 collapse of the
Hyatt Skywalk in Kansas City, those injured or killed were
obviously present in Missouri a t the time of the accident. Those
not residents of the state likely had some minimum contacts
with Missouri which brought them to the area. Furthermore,
most, if not all, of the defendants were subject to Missouri's
jurisdiction because they were defending themselves in the
significant portion of the existing litigation already lodged in
the courts of M i s ~ o u r i . ~ ~
It follows that in most multiparty, multiforum litigation
falling within the ambit of section 4.01 a significant portion of
the related federal cases will be capable of consolidation in the
state transferee court. Consequently, section 4.01 should allow
a meaningful reduction in the duplicative adjudication of parallel state and federal claims.

B. Cooperative Adjudication of Transferable and
Nontransferable Section 4.01 Cases
In addition to reducing duplicative adjudication of parallel
state and federal claims by transferring a significant portion of
related federal cases to a state transferee court, section 4.01's
provisions for consolidation to state courts could reduce the
ultimate costs of adjudicating those federal cases
which-because of due process restraints-are not capable of
being transferred to the state forum.
With most cases consolidated in the state transferee court,
cooperation between the state forum and the federal forum(s)
adjudicating the nontransferable cases is not only highly likely,
but also preferable, and, in fact, indispensable. For example,
after transfemng as many of the cases as possible to the state

70. COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 1, 54.01 (a)(l) at 17.
71. See David R. Morris & Andrew See, The Hyatt Skywalk Litigation: The
Plaintiffs' Perspective, 52 UMKC L. REV.246 (1984).
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court under section 4.01, the Complex Litigation Panel could
consolidate the remaining federal cases in the federal district
court in the district in which the state transferee court sits.72
A transfer in tandem would allow the state and federal judges
to coordinate the litigation through, for example, joint pretrial
conference^,?^ joint d i s ~ o v e r y ,and
~ ~ even joint trial.75 Such
coordination reduces the negative impact of duplicative adjudication on both litigants and on the American judicial system.

The ALI's Complex Litigation Project's proposal to grant
state transferee courts nationwide personal jurisdiction is of
dubious constitutionality. The theories which support a federal
court's exercise of nationwide personal jurisdiction may not
apply within the context of state courts-even when jurisdiction is supposedly derived from a federal statute.
Even though a state transferee court may not be able to
constitutionally exercise nationwide personal jurisdiction, however, the federal-to-state transfer provisions of the Complex
Litigation Project would still serve as a useful tool in reducing
the duplication of effort that unavoidably occurs in the independent adjudication of parallel state and federal claims. Many
of the single event disaster multiforum, multiparty cases filed
in federal court that have related cases that were brought in
state courts should be transferable to a state court--due pro72. See COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL, supra note 1, $ 3.01 for the
Proposal's provisions for federal-to-federal consolidation. See also George T. Conway,
111, The Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96 YALEL.J. 1099,
1111 (1987) (making the argument of tandem transfer in connection with a proposal to amend 28 U.S.C. $1407 to allow the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer cases both to and from state courts).
The question may be (and probably should be) posed as to why, given the
possible inability to consolidate all of the related litigation in the state transferee
forum, should not all such multiforum cases with multiple parties be consolidated
into the federal system. Presumably, in consideration of the factors for designating
a state court as a transferee forum for federal action, see supra part 11, the state,
not the federal, court is the preferable forum for adjudication of claims asserted
under state law.
73. Conway, supra note 72, a t 1111.
74. In the Hyatt Skywalk litigation the federal district court and the state
court cooperated extensively to facilitate "a massive bointl discovery effort."
Conway, a t 1111 (quoting David R. Morris & Andrew See, The Hyatt Skywalk
Litigation: The Plaintiffs' Perspective, 52 UMKC L. REV. 246, 254 (1984)).
75. See MANUALFOR COMPLEXLITIGATION,SECOND,
which suggests that "consideration . . . be given to a joint trial, a t which separate state and federal juries
would sit . . . and hear evidence." $31.31, 11.53 a t 261 (1985).
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cess limitations notwithstanding. Furthermore, even those
cases filed in federal courts but not transferable to the state
forum because of the state forum's lack of personal jurisdiction
can still be effectively coordinated with the state transferee
court, thereby achieving the major efficiency aim of the proposed complex litigation law.
Deborah Dunn

